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Abstract. Protecting privacy against bribery/coercion is a necessary
requirement in electronic services, like e-voting, e-auction and e-health.
Domain-specific privacy properties have been proposed to capture this.
We generalise these properties as enforced privacy : a system enforces
a user’s privacy even when the user collaborates with the adversary.
In addition, we account for the influence of third parties on a user’s
privacy. Third parties can help to break privacy by collaborating with the
adversary, or can help to protect privacy by cooperating with the target
user. We propose independency of privacy to capture the negative privacy
impact that third parties can have, and coalition privacy to capture their
positive privacy impact. We formally define these privacy notions in the
applied pi calculus and build a hierarchy showing their relations.
1 Introduction
Privacy is of great importance to electronic services such as e-voting, e-auction,
and e-health. A large amount of research has been done in this area, for example,
using statistical methods. In the literature, an important focus is privacy in
communication protocols, since most electronic services use the Internet. To
capture privacy in protocols, a wide variety of privacy properties have been
proposed, such as anonymity, untraceability, quantified privacy, etc. (e.g., see [1–
5]). We focus on a subset of such properties – non-quantified (binary) data
privacy, i.e., properties that are either satisfied or not (as opposed to providing
a quantitative answer).
Classical data privacy assumes that users want to keep their privacy [1, 3,
4]. However, a user may want to reveal information to the adversary due to
bribery or coercion. Systems providing electronic services need to protect against
such threats (e.g., [6–9]). This was first achieved in voting: a system in which a
voter could not undo his privacy after voting (preventing vote selling) [6], and
later, a system in which a voter, coerced to communicate continuously with the
adversary, cannot undo his privacy [8]. These ideas were lifted to an e-auction
system [7] and an e-health system [9]. Following this development of stronger
systems, domain-specific formalisations of privacy properties against bribery and
coercion were proposed in the literature: receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance
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in e-voting [10], e-auction [11], and e-health [12]. In order to address these privacy
concerns domain-independently, we propose a generic notion of enforced privacy :
a user’s privacy is preserved even if the user collaborates with the adversary by
sharing information.
Our notions of (enforced) data privacy focus only on one target user – ig-
noring the privacy impact of other users. However, a third party may help to
break user privacy (collaboration), e.g., revealing your vote may enable the ad-
versary to deduce another voter’s vote. On the other hand, a third party can
help maintain privacy (coalition), e.g., a non-coerced voter (who votes as the
adversary desires) can swap receipts with a coerced voter, providing the coerced
voter “proof” of compliance while being free to vote as he pleases. Accounting
for the privacy effect of third parties is particularly necessary in domains where
many non-trusted roles are involved. For example, pharmacists in e-health may
be able to help reveal prescription behaviour of doctors. In order to ensure doctor
prescribing-privacy, an e-health system must prevent this [9, 13]. This require-
ment has been expressed and formalised in e-health [12] and e-voting [14]. In this
paper, we generalise these formalisations as independency of privacy : the help
of a set of third parties does not enable the adversary to break a target user’s
privacy. To capture the converse situation – the privacy effect of third parties
helping the target user by sharing information with the target user, we propose a
new notion of coalition privacy : a target user’s privacy is preserved with the help
of a set of third parties sharing information with the target user. In particular,
we use this notion to also capture the situation where third parties are involved
but no information is shared between the target user and third parties. In this
case, the mere existence of the third parties can help to create a situation where
privacy is preserved.
In addition to identifying these (new) privacy notions, this paper contributes
on formalising them in a new formal framework and formally prove their re-
lations. Cryptographic protocols are well known to be error-prone and formal
approaches have shown to be efficient in addressing this problem, e.g., see [15,
16]. Thus, formalising privacy notions is a necessary step to verify the privacy
claims of a protocol. Our framework is based on the applied pi calculus as it
provides an intuitive way for modelling privacy properties and cryptographic
protocols. In addition, it is supported by the ProVerif [17] tool, which allows us
to verify many privacy properties automatically [18, 19].
We present a formal framework which allows us to give domain-independent
formalisations. We define a standard form of protocols which is able to represent
any protocol. To formally define enforced privacy properties and independency of
privacy properties, we model collaboration between users and the adversary. The
collaboration allows us to precisely specify which information is shared and how
it is shared, thus provides the necessary flexibility for modelling various types of
collaboration. To model coalition privacy properties, we propose the notion of
coalition in our framework to formally capture the behaviour and shared infor-
mation among a target user and a set of third parties. In our framework, the foun-
dational property data-privacy, is formalised in a classical way as strong secrecy:
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Table 1. Privacy notions
target user third parties
collaborates some defending
with adversary all neutral some attacking some defending some attacking
no priv ipriv cpriv cipriv
yes epriv iepriv cepriv ciepriv
equivalence of two processes where a variable is instantiated differently [20].
Based on this property, we formalise enforced-privacy, independency-of-privacy
and independency-of-enforced-privacy using the formalisation of collaboration.
Using the formalisation of coalition, four corresponding coalition privacy prop-
erties are formalised. Finally, we formally discuss how the formalised privacy
properties are related in a privacy hierarchy. In addition, we show that many
existing formalisations are instances of properties in our hierarchy.
2 Privacy Notions
With respect to the classical Dolev-Yao adversary [21]1, we distinguish between
two classes of privacy-affecting behaviour: the target user (collaborating with
the adversary or not), and the behaviour of third parties. Third parties may
be neutral, collaborating with the adversary (attacking), or collaborating with
the target user (defending) – thus we also consider the situation where some
are attacking and some are defending. A target user who collaborates with the
adversary is not under the adversary’s direct control, contrary to a compromised
user who genuinely shares initial private information with the adversary. A neu-
tral third party, like an honest user, follows the protocol specification exactly.
Thus, such a third party neither actively helps nor actively harms the target
user’s privacy. A defending third party helps the target user to preserve his pri-
vacy. An attacking third party communicates with the adversary to break the
target user’s privacy. Note that we do not consider a third party that attacks
and defends the target user simultaneously. Given this classification, a target
user will find himself one of the following four situations w.r.t. third parties:
1) all are neutral; 2) some are attacking; 3) some are defending; and 4) some
are attacking, some are defending. In the latter three cases, the remaining third
parties (if any) are considered neutral. Combining the various behaviours of the
third parties with those of the target user gives rise to eight privacy properties
(see Tab. 1).
Motivation examples for each property are as follows – data-privacy (priv): the
adversary cannot link the contents of an encrypted email to the user; enforced-
1 Note that the Dolev-Yao adversary is not assumed to fully control authenticated
users. Bribed or coerced users cannot be modelled as part of the adversary, as they are
not trusted by the adversary. In addition, it is necessary to model which information
and how users share the information, especially those obtained from channels hidden
from the adversary.
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privacy (epriv): a voter should not be able to prove to a vote-buyer how he
voted; independency-of-privacy (ipriv): in e-health the adversary cannot link a
doctor to his prescriptions, despite the help of a pharmacist; independency-of-
enforced-privacy (iepriv): the adversary should not be able to link a doctor to his
prescriptions (to prevent bribes), even when both the pharmacist and the doctor
are helping him; coalition-privacy (cpriv): in location-based services, the user’s
real location is hidden amongst the locations of the helping users; coalition-
enforced-privacy (cepriv): in anonymous routing, a sender remains anonymous if
he synchronises with a group of senders, even if he seems to collaborate; coalition-
independency-of-privacy (cipriv): the adversary cannot link an RFID chip to its
identity, even though some malicious readers are helping the adversary, provided
other RFID tags behave exactly as the target one; coalition-independency-of-
enforced-privacy (ciepriv): in electronic road pricing, other users may hide a user’s
route from the adversary, even if the user seems to collaborate and malicious
routers relay information on passing cars to the adversary.
The examples above illustrate that similar privacy concerns arise in many
different domains – e-voting, e-health, location-based services, RFID, etc. So far,
attempts at formalising privacy have usually been domain-specific (e.g., [22, 2,
10, 3, 4, 23, 11, 12, 24]). We advocate a domain-independent approach to privacy,
and develop a formal framework to achieve this in Sect. 3.
3 Formal Framework
3.1 The Applied Pi Calculus
The applied pi calculus [25] assumes an infinite set of names to model data and
communication channels, an infinite set of variables and a finite set of function
symbols each with an associated arity to capture cryptographic primitives. A
constant is defined as a function symbol with arity zero. Terms are defined as
either names, or variables or function symbols applied on other terms to capture
communicated messages. We denote the variables in a term N as Var(N). In
addition, the applied pi calculus assumes a set of base types (e.g., the universal
type Data) and a type system (sort system) for terms generated by the base
set. Terms are assumed to be well-typed and syntactic substitutions preserve
types. Processes (see Fig. 1) are defined to model protocols. A name is bound
if it is under restriction. A variable is bound by restrictions or inputs. Names
and variables are free if they are not delimited by restrictions or by inputs.
The sets of free names, free variables, bound names and bound variables of a
process A are denoted as fn(A), fv(A), bn(A) and bv(A), respectively. A term
is ground when it does not contain variables. A process is closed if it does
not contain free variables. {M /x} is a substitution which replaces variable x
with term M . A context C[ ] is defined as a process with a hole, which may be
filled with any process. An evaluation context is a context whose hole is not
under a replication, a conditional, an input or an output. Finally, we use νn˜ to
abbreviate the process generating a list of names (i.e., νn1 · · · νnn) and use νn˜/ni
to abbreviate process νn1 · · · νni−1.νni+1. · · · .νnn (erasing νni from process νn˜).
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Fig. 1. Applied pi processes
P,Q,R ::= plain processes A,B,C ::= extended processes
0 null process P plain process
P | Q parallel composition A | B parallel composition
!P replication νn.A name restriction
νn.P name restriction νx.A variable restriction
if M =E N then {M /x} active substitution
P else Q conditional
in(v, x).P message input
out(v,M).P message output
Several equivalence relations on processes are defined in the applied pi calculus.
We mainly use labelled bisimilarity ≈ℓ [25]. Two processes are labelled bisimilar
if the adversary cannot distinguish them.
3.2 Well-formed Protocols
For the simplicity of formalisation, we define a standard form of a protocol,
inspired by Arapinis et al. [3], and any protocol can be written in this form.
Definition 1 (well-formed protocols). A protocol with p roles is well-formed
if it is a closed plain process Pw of the form:
Pw = νc˜.(genkey |!R1 | · · · |!Rp)
Ri = νidi.νdatai.init i.!(νsi.νsdatai.sinit i.maini) (∀i ∈ {1, · · · , p})
1. Pw is canonical [3]: names and variables in the process never appear both
bound and free, and each name and variable is bound at most once;
2. data is typed, channels are ground, private channels are never sent on any
channel;
3. νc˜, νdatai and νsdatai may be null;
4. init i and sinit i are sequential processes;
5. genkey, init i, sinit i and maini can be any process (possibly null) such that
Pw is a closed plain process.
In process Pw , c˜ are channel names; genkey is a sub-process in which shared data
(e.g., keys shared between two roles) are generated and distributed; Ri (1 ≤ i ≤
p) is a role. To distinguish instances taking the same role Ri, each instance is
dynamically associated with a distinct identity νidi; datai is private data of an
instance; init i models the initialisation of an instance; (νsi.νsdatai.sinit i.maini)
models a session of an instance. To distinguish sessions of the same instance, each
session is dynamically associated to a distinct identity (νsi); sdatai is private
data of a session; sinit i models the initialisation of a session; maini models the
behaviour of a session.
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Note that this standard form does not limit the type of protocols we consider.
A role may include a number of sub-roles so that a user may take more than one
part in a protocol. The identities do not have to be used in the process. All of
νc˜, νdatai and νsdatai may be null and genkey , init i, sinit i and maini can be
any process (possibly null) such that Pw is a closed plain process. Any process
can be written in a canonical form by α-conversion [3]. Thus, any protocol can
be written as a well-formed protocol.
3.3 Data-privacy
We formally define the property data-privacy that acts as the foundation upon
which other properties are built. To do so, we need to make explicit which data
is protected. Thus, the property data-privacy always specifies the target data. In
process Pw , the target data τ can be expressed as a bound name (complicated
target data can be reduced to bound names) which belongs to a role (the target
role Ri), i.e., τ ∈ bn(Ri). For the sake of simplicity, we (re)write the role Ri in
the form of Ri = νidi.ντ.Rˆi , where Rˆi is a plain process which has two variables
id i and τ . By α-conversion we can always transform Ri into the above form.
Intuitively, data-privacy w.r.t. τ of protocol Pw , is the inability of the ad-
versary to link an honest user taking role Ri to his instantiation of the target
data τ . An honest user taking role Ri is modelled as process Ri. Rˆi{id/id , t/τ}
denotes an instance of the target user in which the target user instantiates the
target data with t where t denotes any data which can be used to replace the
target data. The data-privacy can be modelled as strong secrecy [20] of the tar-
get data: the adversary cannot distinguish an execution of Ri where τ = t1 from
an execution where τ = t2, for t1 6= t2.
Definition 2. A well-formed protocol Pw satisfies data-privacy (priv) w.r.t. data
τ (τ ∈ bn(Ri)), if CPw [Rˆi{id/id i , t1/τ}] ≈ℓ CPw [Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ}].
In the above definition, id is a constant, t1 and t2 are free names. Since Ri =
νidi.ντ.Rˆi , process Rˆi{id/id i , t1/τ} is an instance of role Ri where the identity
is id and the target data is t1. The evaluation context CPw [ ] models neutral third
parties. Thus, CPw [Rˆi{id/id i , t1/τ}] is an instance of the protocol Pw , similarly
for CPw [Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ}]. The only difference between these two instances is the
instantiation of the target data τ . Thus, this definition captures data-privacy
by using the relation ≈ℓ: the adversary cannot distinguish a user process with
different target data.
3.4 Modelling Collaboration with the Adversary
In order to define enforced privacy properties where the target user collaborates
with the adversary and independency privacy properties where a set of third
parties collaborate with the adversary, we need to model collaboration of users
(a target user/third parties) with the adversary.
The process of a set of users is modelled as processes of each user in parallel.
Since a user process is modelled as a role in a well-formed protocol and each user
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process can be any role, the set of users of a protocol Pw is formally defined as
a plain process RU = Ru1 | · · · | Rum , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},Rui ∈ {R1, . . . ,Rp}.
Inspired by the formal definition of coercion in [10], the collaboration between
a set of users and the adversary is formalised as a transformation of the process
of the set of users. Note that a user may not always share all his information,
e.g., a bribed user in a social network may reveal his relation with another user,
but not his password. A way to express partly information sharing is to specify
which terms of a process are shared and how they are shared. Since the process of
a set of users is canonical in a well-formed protocol, bound names and variables
are different in each user process. Thus, we can express information of a set
of users as a set of terms appearing in the process of the set of users. Terms
appearing in a plain process RU are Term(RU ).
Term(0) = ∅ Term(P | Q) = Term(P ) ∪ Term(Q)
Term(!P ) = Term(P ) Term(νn.P ) = {n} ∪ Term(P )
Term(in(v, x).P ) = {x} ∪ Term(P ) Term(out(v,M).P ) = {M} ∪ Term(P )
Term(if M =E N then P else Q) = Term(P ) ∪ Term(Q)
Thus, a collaboration can be specified as a specification defined as follows.
Definition 3 (collaboration specification). A collaboration specification of
a process RU is a tuple 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉. Ψ ⊆ Term(RU ) denotes the set of terms
sent to the adversary each of which is of base type, Φ ⊆ Term(RU ) represents
terms to be replaced by information provided by the adversary, cout is a fresh
channel for sending information to the adversary, and cin is a fresh channel for
reading information from the adversary, i.e., cout , cin /∈ fn(RU ) ∪ bn(RU ).
Given a plain process RU and a collaboration specification 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 of
the process, the transformation of RU is given by R
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
U .
Definition 4 (collaboration behaviour). Let RU be a plain process, and
〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 be a collaboration specification of RU . Collaboration behaviour
of RU according to 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 is defined as:
• 0 〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 =ˆ 0,
• (P | Q)〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 =ˆ P 〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 | Q〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉,
• (!P)〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 =ˆ !P 〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉,
• (νn.P)〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 =ˆ
{
νn.out(cout , n).P
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 if n ∈ Ψ ,
νn.P 〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 otherwise,
• (in(v , x ).P)〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 =ˆ
{
in(v, x).out(cout , x).P
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 if x ∈ Ψ ,
in(v, x).P 〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 otherwise,
• (out(v ,M ).P)〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 =ˆ


in(cin , x).out(v, x).P
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 if M ∈ Φ
∧cin 6= ⊥, where x is a fresh variable,
out(v,M).P 〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 otherwise,
• (if M =E N then P else Q)
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 =ˆ

in(cin , x).if x = true then P
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉else Q〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 if cin 6= ⊥,
where x is a fresh variable and true is a constant,
if M =E N then P
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 else Q〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉 otherwise.
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Note that we use cin = ⊥ to denote that the adversary neither prepares informa-
tion for the coerced users nor controls the conditional evaluations of the users.
We only specify user behaviour in a collaboration with the adversary. The ad-
versary’s behaviour may be omitted, as in the applied pi calculus the adversary
is considered as the environment and does not need to be explicitly modelled.
Our approach to reasoning about the adversary’s behaviour in a collaboration
(e.g., enforcing a voter to cast a particular vote) follows the line of the definition
of coercion-resistance in [10]. Namely, a context C[ ] = νcout .νcin( | Q) models
a specific way of collaboration of the adversary, where Q models the adversary’s
behaviour in the context. In this way, we separate the adversary’s behaviour of
distinguishing two processes, which is modelled by the environment, from the
behaviour of collaborating with users which is modelled by the context.
3.5 Modelling User Coalitions
To define coalition privacy properties, we need to formally define a coalition
between a target user and a set of defending third parties. The notion collabora-
tion from the previous section cannot be adopted directly, as it does not specify
the adversary’s behaviour, whereas a coalition must specify the behaviour of all
involved users.
Given a set of users RU = Ru1 | · · · | Rum , a coalition of the users specifies
communication between (potentially) each pair of users. For every communica-
tion, a coalition specification needs to make explicit who the sender and receiver
are (unlike collaboration). Similar to the specification of collaboration, a coali-
tion specification makes explicit which data is sent on which channel. To make
the behaviour of both communicating parties explicit, we need to specify how
the term in a communication is referred to in the receiver’s process. A commu-
nication in a coalition is specified as a tuple 〈Rui ,Ruj ,M, c, y〉 where Rui ,Ruj ∈
{Ru1 , . . . ,Rum} (Rui 6= Ruj ) are the sender and receiver process, respectively;
M ∈ Term(Rui) is the data sent in the communication; c 6∈ fn(RU ) ∪ bn(RU )
is a fresh channel used in the communication; y 6∈ fv(RU ) ∪ bv(RU ) is the vari-
able used by the receiver to refer to the term M . A coalition specifies a set of
communications of this type (denoted as Θ). For the simplicity of modelling, we
assume that for each communication, the coalition uses a distinct channel and
distinct variable, i.e., ∀ 〈Rui ,Ruj ,M, c, y〉 ∈ Θ and 〈R
′
ui
,R′uj ,M
′, c′, y′〉 ∈ Θ we
have c 6= c′ ∧ y 6= y′.
A coalition specifies a set of terms which are communicated by the originat-
ing user process and are replaced in the coalition. In addition, a coalition needs
to define how a term is replaced. In a collaboration, the adversary is assumed to
be able to compute and prepare this, but in a coalition, no user can compute and
prepare information for other users. Thus, this ability has to be explicitly speci-
fied in a coalition as a set of substitutions ∆ = {{N /M } |M ∈ Term(RU )}. The
new term N are calculated from a set of terms N1, . . . , Nn which are generated
by the user, read in by the original process, or read in from coalition members.
A successful coalition requires that there are no such situations where N cannot
be calculated in the user process when M needs to be replaced.
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Moreover, in a coalition, we allow the coalition to decide values of conditional
evaluations (similar to collaboration, where the adversary decides this). Since
no user in a coalition has the ability to specify the values of evaluations, these
need to be assigned specifically. In addition, to add more flexibility, we allow a
coalition to specify which evaluations are decided by the coalition and which are
not. The evaluations of a plain user process RU is Eval(RU ). The assignments of
evaluations are specified as a set Π ⊆ {(e, b) | e ∈ Eval(RU ) ∧ b ∈ {true, false}}.
Eval(0) = ∅ Eval(P | Q) = Eval(P ) ∪ Eval(Q)
Eval(!P ) = Eval(P ) Eval(νn.P ) = Eval(P )
Eval(in(v, x).P ) = Eval(P ) Eval(out(v,M).P ) = Eval(P )
Eval(if M =E N then P else Q) = {M =E N} ∪ Eval(P ) ∪ Eval(Q)
Definition 5 (coalition specification). A coalition2 of a set of users RU is
specified as a tuple 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉 where Θ is a set of communication, ∆ is a set of
substitutions and Π is an assignment for a set of evaluations.
With the above setting, given a set of users RU and a coalition specification
〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉 on users, the behaviour of a user in the coalition is modelled as a
coalition transformation of the user’s original process, as defined in Def. 6.
In the definition, process in(c1, y
′
1).!out(c
′
1, y
′
1) | · · · | in(cℓ, y
′
ℓ).!out(c
′
ℓ, y
′
ℓ)
models the receiving behaviour of process R in the coalition. The coalition spec-
ifies which channel is use to receive data. The received data on a channel are
referred to as a distinct fresh variable. The received data is sent out over a dis-
tinct private channel. The association of channels and variables is modelled in ξ.
This sending behaviour is used for the process R〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉 to read the data when it
is needed. Process R〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉 models the sending behaviour, substitution of terms,
assignments of evaluations. F captures the variables which are in {y1, . . . , yℓ}
and has not been read in yet.
Definition 6 (coalition behaviour). Let RU = Ru1 | · · · | Rum be a plain
process of a set of users, 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉 be a coalition specification of process RU ,
R ∈ {Ru1 , · · · ,Rum} be a plain user process, the transformation of the process
R in the coalition is given by R〈Θ,∆,Π 〉:
R〈Θ,∆,Π 〉 = νη.(R〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉 | in(c1, y
′
1).!out(c
′
1, y
′
1) | · · · | in(cℓ, y
′
ℓ).!out(c
′
ℓ, y
′
ℓ))
where Γ = {〈R,Ruj ,M, c, y〉 | 〈R,Ruj ,M, c, y〉 ∈ Θ}, η = {c
′
1, . . . , c
′
ℓ}, c
′
1,
. . ., c′ℓ are fresh, {c1, . . . , cℓ} = {c | 〈Rui ,R,M, c, y〉 ∈ Θ}, y
′
1, . . . , y
′
ℓ are fresh
variables, ξ = {(c1, y
′
1, c
′
1), . . . , (cℓ, y
′
ℓ, c
′
ℓ)} defines the association of channels
and variables in process in(c1, y
′
1).!out(c
′
1, y
′
1) | · · · | in(cℓ, y
′
ℓ).!out(c
′
ℓ, y
′
ℓ), and
2 This model does not include the coalition strategies in which the target users and
defending third parties are able to generate new data, initiate new sessions, estab-
lishing new secrets, etc.
9
R〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉 is given by:
• 0
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F =ˆ 0,
• (P | Q)
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F =ˆ P
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F | Q
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F ,
• (!P)
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F =ˆ !P
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F ,
• (νn.P)
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F =ˆ


νn.out(c1, n). . . . .out(cℓ, n).P
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F
if {c1, . . . , cℓ} = {c | 〈R,Ruj , n, c, y〉 ∈ Γ} ,
νn.P
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F otherwise,
• (in(v , x ).P)
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F =ˆ


in(v, x).out(c1, x). . . . .out(cℓ, x).P
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F
if {c1, . . . , cℓ} = {c | 〈R,Ruj , x, c, y〉 ∈ Γ} ,
in(v, x).P
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F otherwise,
• (out(v ,M ).P)
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F =ˆ


in(c′1, y1). · · · .in(c
′
ℓ, yℓ).out(v,N).P
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F\{y1 ,...,yℓ}
if {N /M } ∈ ∆, {y1, . . . , yℓ} ⊆ F ∪ Var(N),
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},
〈Ri,R, ciM,yi〉 ∈ Θ ∧ (ci, y
′
i, c
′
i) ∈ ξ,
out(v,M).P
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F otherwise,
• (if M =E N then P else Q)
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F =ˆ

P
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F if (M =E N, true) ∈ Π ,
Q
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F if (M =E N, false) ∈ Π ,
if M =E N then P
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F else Q
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉
F otherwise.
with F initially equals to {y1, . . . , yℓ | 〈Rui ,R,M, c, y〉 ∈ Θ}.
Given a set of users RU and a coalition specification 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉 for them, the
coalition is now modelled as R
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉
U = νΩ .(R
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉
u1 | · · · | R
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉
um ) where
Ω = {c | 〈Rui ,Ruj ,M, c, y〉 ∈ Θ}.
4 Formalising the Privacy Notions
4.1 Enforced-privacy
Enforced-privacy is the adversary’s unlinkability of a target user to his data even
when the user collaborates with the adversary. Different collaborations impact
privacy differently, so when we say a protocol satisfies enforced-privacy, it always
refers to a specific collaboration specification.
Similar as in receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance [10], when a protocol
Pw satisfies enforced-privacy w.r.t. a target data τ (which belongs to role Ri)
and a collaboration specification 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 defined on process Rˆi (where
Ri = νidi.ντ.Rˆi), there exists a process Pf for the target user to execute, such
that the adversary cannot distinguish between real collaboration with τ = t1
and fake collaboration (by means of process Pf ) with τ = t2.
3
3 In the epistemic notion of coercion-resistance, enforced-privacy can be defined as
the existence of a counter-strategy for the target user to achieve his own goal, but
the adversary cannot distinguish it from the target user following the adversary’s
instructions [26].
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Definition 7. A well-formed protocol Pw satisfies enforced-privacy (epriv) w.r.t.
target data τ and collaboration specification 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉, if there exists a
closed plain process Pf , such that for any context C[ ] = νcout .νcin .( | Q) satis-
fying bn(Pw ) ∩ fn(C[ ]) = ∅ and CPw [C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}]] ≈ℓ
CPw [Rˆ
〈Ψ ,∅,c′out ,⊥〉
i {id/id i , t1/τ}], we have
1. C[Pf ]
\(c′out ,·) ≈ℓ Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ},
2. CPw [C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}]] ≈ℓ CPw [C[Pf ]],
where τ ∈ bn(Ri), Ri = νidi.ντ.Rˆi , 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 is defined on Rˆi , t is a free
name representing a piece of data, and C[Pf ]
\(c′out ,·) = νc′out .(C[Pf ] |!in(c
′
out , x)).
The process Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ} models the behaviour of the collaborat-
ing target user. The behaviour of the adversary in the collaboration is implicitly
modelled as Q in the context C[ ] = νcout .νcin .( | Q). Thus a specific collab-
oration is modelled as C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}]. Note that sometimes the
target data in the collaboration is not decided by {t/τ}, but by the context C[ ].
The target data is actually instantiated by CPw [C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}]]
≈ℓ CPw [Rˆ
〈Ψ ,∅,c′out ,⊥〉
i {id/id i , t1/τ}]. The first equivalence shows that even if the
context C[ ] is able to decide the target data, the target user can still actually
instantiate the target data with t2 by executing the process Pf . The second
equivalence shows that the adversary cannot distinguish the target user follow-
ing the collaboration in process Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ} from executing the
process Pf , in the context of the adversary collaboration C[ ].
4.2 Independency-of-privacy
Next, we account for attacking third parties. As different sets of third parties
may differently influence the target user’s privacy, and since different collab-
oration amongst the same third parties leads to different privacy properties,
independency-of-privacy is defined with respect to a set of third parties and a
collaboration specification between them and the adversary.
Definition 8 (third parties). Given a well-formed protocol Pw and an in-
stance of the target user Rˆi{id/id , t/τ}, a set of third parties is defined as a set
of users RU = Ru1 | · · · | Rum where ∀i ∈ {1, · · · ,m},Rui 6= Rˆi{id/id , t/τ}.
We use RT to denote a set of attacking third parties and RD to denote a set of
defending third parties.
The collaboration between a set of attacking third parties RT and the ad-
versary is expressed as a collaboration specification 〈Ψ t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉 defined
on process RT . The behaviour of the third parties in the collaboration is mod-
elled as R
〈Ψ t ,Φt ,ctout ,c
t
in〉
T . Inspired by the domain-specific formal definitions, vote-
independence [14] in e-voting and independency-of-prescribing-privacy [12] in e-
health, independency-of-privacy is defined as follows: a well-formed protocol Pw
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satisfies independency-of-privacy w.r.t. (RT , 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉) and τ ∈ bn(Ri),
if the adversary cannot distinguish the honest target user executing role Ri
with τ = t1 from the same user with τ = t2, even when the set of third par-
ties RT collaborates with the adversary according to collaboration specification
〈Ψ t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉.
Definition 9. A well-formed protocol Pw satisfies independency-of-privacy (ipriv)
w.r.t. data τ and attacking third parties (RT , 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉) if
CPw [Rˆi{id/id i , t1/τ} | R
〈Ψ t ,Φt ,ctout ,c
t
in〉
T ] ≈ℓ CPw [Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ} | R
〈Ψ t ,Φt ,ctout ,c
t
in〉
T ],
where 〈Ψ t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉 is a collaboration specification of process RT .
If the equivalence holds, then despite this collaboration, adversary cannot distin-
guish Rˆi{id/id i , t1/τ} in which the target user uses τ = t1 from Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ}
in which the target user uses τ = t2.
4.3 Independency-of-enforced-privacy
We define independency-of-enforced-privacy (iepriv) based on epriv in a simi-
lar fashion as ipriv. More precisely, iepriv of a protocol Pw is defined w.r.t.
target data τ ∈ bn(Ri), a collaboration specification 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 defined
on process Rˆi with Ri = νidi.ντ.Rˆi , and a set of attacking third parties to-
gether with a collaboration specification defined on the third parties processes
(RT , 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉). A well-formed protocol Pw satisfies iepriv w.r.t. τ ,
〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉, and (RT , 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉), if there exists a closed plain pro-
cess Pf for the target user to execute, such that, despite the help of third parties
RT according to 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉, the adversary cannot distinguish between
the target user collaborating with τ = t1, and him really using τ = t2 but
faking collaboration for τ = t1 by Pf .
Definition 10. A well-formed protocol Pw satisfies independency-of-enforced-
privacy (iepriv) w.r.t. τ , 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉, and (RT , 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉), if there
exists a closed plain process Pf , such that for any C[ ] = νcout .νcin .( | Q)
satisfying bn(Pw ) ∩ fn(C[ ]) = ∅ and CPw [C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}] | RT ] ≈ℓ
CPw [Rˆ
〈Ψ ,∅,c′out ,⊥〉
i {id/id i , t1/τ} | RT ], we have
1. C[Pf ]
\(c′out ,·) ≈ℓ Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ},
2. CPw [C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}] | R
〈Ψ t ,Φt ,ctout ,c
t
in〉
T ]
≈ℓ CPw [C[Pf ] | R
〈Ψ t ,Φt ,ctout ,c
t
in〉
T ],
where 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 is a collaboration specification for target user process Rˆi ,
and 〈Ψ t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉 is a collaboration specification of third party process RT .
This formalisation adds third parties collaboration R
〈Ψ t ,Φt ,ctout ,c
t
in〉
T to Def. 7.
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4.4 Coalition Privacy Properties
Corresponding to each privacy property defined above, we define coalition pri-
vacy properties which take into account defending third parties.
Definition 11 (defensive coalition). Given an instance of the target user
Rˆi{id/id , t/τ}, a set of defending third parties RD, and a coalition specifica-
tion 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉 defined on (Rˆi{id/id , t/τ} | RD), the coalition is modelled as
νΩ .(Rˆi{id/id , t/τ} | RD)
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉, where Ω = {c | 〈Rui ,Ruj ,M, c, y〉 ∈ Θ}.
The target user’s behaviour in the coalition is Rˆi{id/id , t/τ}
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉
=
νη.((Rˆi{id/id , t/τ})
〈Γ ,∆,Π 〉|Pγ), where η is a set of fresh channels {c
′
i, . . . , c
′
ℓ},
Γ = {〈Rˆi{id/id , t/τ},Ruj ,M, c, y〉 | 〈Rˆi{id/id , t/τ},Ruj ,M, c, y〉 ∈ Θ}, and
Pγ = in(c1, y
′
1).!out(c
′
1, y
′
1) | · · · | in(cℓ, y
′
ℓ).!out(c
′
ℓ, y
′
ℓ) with {y
′
1, . . . , y
′
ℓ} being
fresh variables, and {(c1, . . . , cℓ} = {c | 〈Rui , Rˆi{id/id , t/τ},M, c, y〉 ∈ Θ}. The
third parties’ behaviour in the coalition is R
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉
D .
Coalition-privacy. Intuitively, coalition-privacy means that a target user’s pri-
vacy is preserved due to the cooperation of a set of defending third parties.
A well-formed protocol Pw satisfies coalition-privacy w.r.t. τ ∈ bn(Ri) and
(RD, 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉) (〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉 is defined on Rˆi | RD, where Ri = νidi.ντ.Rˆi),
if the adversary cannot distinguish an honest user in role Ri using τ = t1 from
the user actually using τ = t2 while helped by a set of defending third parties.
Definition 12. A well-formed protocol Pw satisfies coalition-privacy (cpriv) w.r.t.
data τ and coalition (RD, 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉) if CPw [Rˆi{id/id i , t1/τ} | RD] ≈ℓ
CPw [νΩ .(Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ} | RD)
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉], where 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉 is a coalition speci-
fication defined on Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ} | RD.
In the definition, the coalition is modelled as νΩ .(Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ} | RD)
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉,
where the target user instantiates the target data with t2. The equivalence shows
that the adversary cannot distinguish the target user instantiating the target
data with t2 in the coalition from the target user instantiating the target data
with t1. In this way, coalition-privacy ensures the target user’s privacy when
there exists a set of third parties cooperating with him following a pre-defined
coalition specification.
Coalition-enforced-privacy. Taking into account defending third parties, we
define coalition-enforced-privacy based on enforced-privacy. As before, coalition-
enforced-privacy specifies a target data τ and a collaboration specification of the
target user 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉. As in coalition-privacy, coalition-enforced-privacy
specifies a set of defending third parties RD and a coalition specification 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉.
In coalition-enforced-privacy, the target user both cooperates with the adversary
and defending third parties. Similar to enforced-privacy, we assume that the tar-
get user lies to the adversary if possible. We do not assume that the target user
lies to the defending third parties, as they help the target user maintain privacy.
Intuitively, coalition-enforced-privacy means that a target user is able to lie
to the adversary about his target data when helped by defending third par-
ties – the adversary cannot tell whether the user lied. This property is mod-
elled as the combination of coalition-privacy and enforced-privacy: a protocol
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Pw satisfies coalition-enforced-privacy w.r.t τ ∈ bn(Ri), 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 and
(RD, 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉), for 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 a collaboration specification defined on Rˆi
with Ri = νidi.ντ.Rˆi , and 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉 a coalition specification defined on the
target user and RD, if there exists a process Pf , such that the adversary cannot
distinguish between genuine collaboration with τ = t1 and faking collaboration
using Pf with the help of the coalition for τ = t2.
Definition 13. A well-formed protocol Pw satisfies coalition-enforced-privacy
(cepriv) w.r.t. data τ , 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 and (RD, 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉), if there exists a
closed plain process Pf , such that for any C[ ] = νcout .νcin .( | Q) satis-
fying bn(Pw ) ∩ fn(C[ ]) = ∅ and CPw [C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}] | RD] ≈ℓ
CPw [Rˆ
〈Ψ ,∅,c′out ,⊥〉
i {id/id i , t1/τ} | RD], we have
1. νΩ .(νη.(C[Pf ]
\(c′out ,·) | Pγ) | R
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉
D ) ≈ℓ νΩ .(Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ} | RD)
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉,
2. CPw [C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}] | RD]
≈ℓ CPw [νΩ .(νη.(C[Pf ] | Pγ) | R
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉
D )],
where Ω, η, Pγ are defined in Def. 11, 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 is defined on Rˆi , 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉
is a coalition specification defined on Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ} | RD.
The collaboration between the target user and the adversary instantiating the
target data with t1 is modelled by CPw [C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}] | RD] ≈ℓ
CPw [Rˆ
〈Ψ ,∅,c′out ,⊥〉
i {id/id i , t1/τ} | RD]. The target user’s actual behaviour of in-
stantiating the target data with t2 in process Pf is modelled as the first equiv-
alence. The second equivalence shows that the adversary cannot distinguish the
target user following the collaboration with the adversary from the target user
lying to the adversary with the help of defending third parties.
Coalition-independency-of-privacy. Similarly, we define the privacy notion
of coalition-independency-of-privacy with respect to a target data τ , a set of at-
tacking third parties with a collaboration specification (RT , 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉),
and a set of defending third parties RD with a coalition specification 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉.
Note that we require that there is no intersection between attacking third parties
and defending third parties, i.e., RT ∩RD = ∅, as we assume a third party can-
not be both attacking and defending at the same time. A well-formed protocol
Pw satisfies coalition-independency-of-privacy w.r.t. τ , (RT , 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉)
and (RD, 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉), if the adversary, even with the collaboration of a set of
attacking third parties, cannot distinguish the target user instantiating τ = t1
from the target user actually instantiating τ = t2 in the coalition with the help
of defending third parties.
Definition 14. A well-formed protocol Pw satisfies coalition-independency-of-
privacy (cipriv) w.r.t. data τ , (RT , 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉), and (RD, 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉), if
CPw [Rˆi{id/id i , t1/τ} | RD | R
〈Ψ t ,Φt ,ctout ,c
t
in〉
T ]
≈ℓ CPw [νΩ .((Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ} | RD)
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉) | R
〈Ψ t ,Φt ,ctout ,c
t
in〉
T ],
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where 〈Ψ t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉 is a collaboration specification of process RT , 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉
is a coalition specification defined on Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ} | RD.
Coalition-independency-of-enforced-privacy. Finally, we consider the case
combining all situations together: the target user collaborates with the adversary
following 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉, a set of attacking third parties RT collaborate with
the adversary following 〈Ψ t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉, and a set of defending third parties
RD and a coalition 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉). We formally define the property as follows.
Definition 15. A well-formed protocol Pw satisfies coalition-independency-of-
enforced-privacy (ciepriv) w.r.t. τ , 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉, (RT , 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉),
(RD, 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉), if there exists a closed plain process Pf such that for any context
C[ ] = νcout .νcin .( | Q) satisfying bn(Pw ) ∩ fn(C[ ]) = ∅ and
CPw [C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}] | RT | RD] ≈ℓ CPw [Rˆ
〈Ψ ,∅,c′out ,⊥〉
i {id/id i , t1/τ} |
RT | RD], we have
1. νΩ .(νη.(C[Pf ]
\(c′out ,·) | Pγ) | R
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉
D ) ≈ℓ νΩ .((Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ}|RD)
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉),
2. CPw [C[Rˆ
〈Ψ ,Φ,cout ,cin〉
i {id/id i , t/τ}] | RD | R
〈Ψ t ,Φt ,ctout ,c
t
in〉
T ]
≈ℓ CPw [νΩ .(νη.(C[Pf ] | Pγ) | R
〈Θ,∆,Π 〉
D ) | R
〈Ψ t ,Φt ,ctout ,c
t
in〉
T ],
where Ω, η, Pγ are defined in Def. 11, 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 is a collaboration speci-
fication defined on Rˆi , 〈Ψ
t ,Φt , ctout , c
t
in〉 is a collaboration specification defined
on RT , 〈Θ ,∆,Π 〉 is a coalition specification defined on Rˆi{id/id i , t2/τ} | RD.
Remark. As certain coalitions may fail to maintain privacy, the coalition privacy
properties can be generalised by requiring the existence of a successful coalition.
The general version of coalition privacy properties allows us to reason about the
existence of a coalition such that a user’s privacy is preserved. How to find such
a coalition is an interesting topic for studying coalition privacy properties. Each
property defined in the above can be instantiated in many different forms by
specifying the parameters of the property (such as target data, collaboration,
coalition). Furthermore, only the target user is allowed to lie to the adversary –
we do not consider lying third parties. Properties, ipriv, iepriv, cipriv and ciepriv,
can be extended by allowing third parties to lie. For details, see [27].
5 Relations between the Privacy Notions
We show the relations between the privacy properties in Fig. 2: ρ specifies a
collaboration of the target user with the adversary, θ specifies a set of attacking
third parties and their collaboration with the adversary, and δ specifies a set of
defending third parties and their coalition with the target user.
The left diamond in Fig. 2 shows the relations between privacy properties
which do not consider defending third parties while the right diamond shows
the relations between privacy properties which consider defending third parties.
In the left diamond, eprivρ and iprivθ are stronger than priv, meaning that if
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a protocol satisfies eprivρ or iprivθ, then the protocol satisfies priv. Intuitively,
if the adversary cannot break privacy with the help from the target user (in
eprivρ) or from a set of attacking third parties (in iprivθ), the adversary can-
not break privacy without any help (in priv). Similarly, if the adversary cannot
break privacy with the help from both target user and attacking third parties
(in ieprivρ,θ), the adversary cannot break privacy with the help from only one
of them (in eprivρ and iprivθ). Thus, ieprivρ,θ is stronger than both enforced-
privacyρ and iprivθ. This is described as Thm. 1. Similar reasoning holds in
the right diamond as described in Thm. 2. Each privacy property in the left
diamond has a weaker corresponding property in the right diamond, mean-
ing that if a protocol satisfies a privacy property in the left diamond, there
exists a coalition such that the property satisfies the corresponding coalition
privacy property in the right diamond. Intuitively, if a protocol preserves pri-
vacy of a target user without any help from third parties, the protocol can still
preserve his privacy with the help from others. This is described as Thm. 3.
Fig. 2. Relations of the privacy notions
ieprivρ,θ
cieprivρ,θ,δ
eprivρ iprivθ
ceprivρ,δ ciprivθ,δ
priv
cprivδ
∃δ
∃δ ∃δ
∃δ
Theorem 1. (1) ∀θ, ieprivρ,θ
=⇒ eprivρ, (2) ∀ρ, ieprivρ,θ =⇒
iprivθ, (3) ∀ρ, eprivρ =⇒ priv,
and (4) ∀θ, iprivθ =⇒ priv.
Theorem 2. (1) ∀θ, cieprivρ,θ,δ
=⇒ ceprivρ,δ, (2) ∀ρ, cieprivρ,θ,δ
=⇒ ciprivθ,δ, (3) ∀ρ, ceprivρ,δ =⇒
cprivδ, and (4) ∀θ, ciprivθ,δ =⇒
cprivδ.
Theorem 3. (1) cieprivρ,θ =⇒
∃δ, cieprivρ,θ,δ, (2) eprivρ =⇒
∃δ,ceprivρ,δ, (3) iprivθ =⇒ ∃δ,
ciprivθ,δ, and (4) priv =⇒ ∃δ, cprivδ.
6 Discussion
Privacy notions modelled as strong secrecy can be captured by data-privacy.
For instance, anonymity [3] is data-privacy where the target data is a user’s
identity. Various domain-specific properties, which capture privacy in domains
where data-privacy is too strong to be satisfied, can be instantiated by cpriv. For
instance, bidding-privacy [11] in sealed-bid e-auctions is defined as the adversary
cannot determine a bidder’s bidding-price, assuming the existence of a winning
bid. This can be instantiated as cpriv where the target data is a bid, the defending
third party is the winning bidder and the coalition specification is 〈∅, ∅, ∅〉. Vote-
privacy [22] is defined as the adversary cannot determine a voter’s vote with the
existence of a counter-balancing voter. This can be instantiated as cpriv where
the target data is a vote, the defending third party is the counter-balancing voter
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and the coalition specification is 〈∅,∆, ∅〉 where ∆ specifies how to replace the
counter-balancing voter’s vote.
Enforced privacy notions like receipt-freeness or coercion-resistance can be
captured by either epriv or cepriv. Receipt-freeness [10] in voting can be instan-
tiated by cepriv, where the target data and the coalition are the same as in vote-
privacy, and the collaboration specification is 〈Ψ , ∅, cout ,⊥〉 where Ψ contains
all private terms generated and read-in in the target voter process. Similarly,
coercion-resistance [10] in voting is an instance of coalition-enforced-privacy.
The two independency of privacy properties, independency-of-prescribing-
privacy and independence-vote-privacy, are instances of cipriv. For example, the
property independence-vote-privacy [14] can be considered as an instance of
cipriv, where the target data and the coalition are the same as in vote-privacy, the
set of attacking third parties is a third voter, and the collaboration specification
of the third voter is 〈Ψ ,Φ, cout , cin〉 where Ψ are all generated and read-in terms
and Φ are all communicated terms in the third voter process. For details, see [27].
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have identified (enforced) privacy notions in the presence of
third parties. We formalised the collaboration of users, including the target user
and attacking third parties, with the adversary and the coalition among users
(the target user with defending third parties) in a generic way. The identified
privacy notions are formally defined in the applied pi calculus. We presented
the relations among the properties as a privacy hierarchy. We also showed that
various existing privacy properties in the literature can be instantiated as one
of the properties in the hierarchy.
We have already mentioned a few interesting research directions in the paper,
for example, how to find a coalition and synthesise strategy for the coalition to
satisfy some coalition privacy properties for a protocol, and how to extend our
privacy hierarchy to capture situations where a third party is coerced but has
a strategy to lie to the adversary. One important future work is to apply our
privacy notions to real-world applications such as online social networks.
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